Chakravorti, Gunther, and Moore suggest a subtle, yet far-reaching, tension in the objectives specified by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA) for the Federal Reserve’s role in providing retail payment services, such as check processing. Specifically, we argue that the requirement of an overall cost-revenue match, coupled with the...
In this article, Chakravorti asks why have general-purpose stored-value cards been unsuccessful in penetrating the U.S. market? Three necessary conditions for a payment instrument to be successful are discussed: consumers and merchants need to be convinced of its advantages over existing payment alternatives for at least some types of transactions...
In his lecture as part of a broader course on Effective Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems: Maintaining Financial Plumbing edited by Charles Kahn, Chakravorti describes the underlying economics of retail payments including substitution of payment instruments, regulation of them, and underlying incentives to use them. He looks at specific...
In his presentation to Bank of Mexico economists and payment experts, Chakravorti presented an update of economic models that consider various forms of regulation.
Bolt and Chakravorti study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumer's payment instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure themselves against three types of shocks - income, theft, and their merchant match. Merchants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs...
Bolt and Chakravorti explain how a payment network operates. Having established the payment network framework, they discuss the costs and benefits of providing and using payment cards relative to various other types of payment instruments. Next, they review the key contributions to the theoretical payment card literature. They consider papers...
The proportion of retail, non-cash payments made electronically in the U.S. grew from 15% in 1979 to 40% in 2000. A recent Chicago Fed conference addressed the important question of whether today's payment networks can adequately support emerging payment technologies.
Credit cards provide benefits to consumers and merchants not provided by other payment instruments as evidenced by their explosive growth in the number and value of transactions over the last 20 years. Recently, credit card networks have come under scrutiny from regulators and antitrust authorities around the world. The costs...
In this article, Chakravorti and McHugh address why consumers, merchants, and financial institutions are reluctant to embrace electronic payments even though electronic payment networks, such as the credit card and automated clearinghouse (ACH) networks, have existed for more than 25 years. While most Internet-based transactions are primarily processed via credit...
Chakravorti and Roson construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric networks, and alternative assumptions about consumer preferences. We find...