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Book Chapter | June 15, 2007

Linkages Between Consumer Payments and Credit

Regulation of Payment Cards

Chakra Advisors LLC has deep expertise about the economics of payment cards.

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Linkages between Consumer Payments and Credit Springer

Topics

Banking Lending Payments
By: Sujit Chakravorti
Source: Household Credit Usage: Personal Debt and Mortgages, editors: Sumit Agarwal and Brent Ambrose

Payors, those that make payments, and payees, those that receive payments, choose among various payment instruments based on their preferences toward convenience, risk, and cost. According to a recent U.S. survey, the usage of payment cards is increasing as a proportion of in-store sales while check usage continues to decrease (American Bankers Association and Dove Consulting 2005). Recently, a café in Washington, D.C. stopped accepting cash for purchases primarily because of the cost of safekeeping (National Public Radio 2006). This shift toward electronic payments is occurring because they offer greater benefits to a growing set of consumers and merchants.

There are two forms of credit associated with payments—payment credit and consumption credit. Payment credit is the credit that is extended by the receiver of payment or a third-party until the payment instrument is converted into good funds. For example, payment credit is granted by the recipient of funds when she accepts a check in exchange for goods and services. Today, greater use of real-time authorization systems along with faster clearing of payment instruments has significantly reduced payment credit risk. Consumption credit is extended by the payee or a third-party, which is separate from payment credit. For example, credit card issuers extend credit to their cardholders, which can be paid at the end of the billing cycle or over a longer time period. Cardholders choose when to pay back these loans subject to minimum payment requirements. Financial institutions also offer overdraft facilities to reduce payment defaults on checks due to non-sufficient funds and fees associated with bounced checks. While consumers bear the cost of overdraft facilities, merchants benefit from potentially fewer bounced checks. Similarly, payees can contract with third parties to reduce this risk as well.

A key issue that has received attention globally is the pricing of payment and consumption credit to consumers and merchants especially for payment cards. In the case of credit and debit cards, merchants pay a fee to their financial institutions, called acquirers, for each payment transaction. Acquirers pay interchange fees to issuers, those that issue payment cards, for each transaction. In the case of credit cards, some have argued that issuers use their revenue from interchange fees to encourage consumers to make more purchases with their credit cards instead of less costly payment instruments such as PIN-based debit cards. Defenders of the current interchange fee pricing structure argue that the fee is necessary to balance the demands of consumers and merchants. In other words, both consumers and merchants benefit from the extensions of credit.

After discussing the costs and benefits of major retail payment instruments, Chakravorti reviews a number of regulatory and legal challenges to the payment card industry. Most of these challenges question the degree of competition and its impact on consumer and merchant welfare. Following this discussion, he reviews two academic models that focus on the benefits of consumption credit to consumers and merchants along with how that credit is priced.

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Economics of Payment Cards: A Status Report

Bolt and Chakravorti explain how a payment network operates. Having established the payment network framework, they discuss the costs and benefits of providing and using payment cards relative to various other types of payment instruments. Next, they review the key contributions to the theoretical payment card literature. They consider papers with models that focus on interchange fees, price differentiation at the point of sale, network competition, the role of credit, and the pricing of payment services when a bank provides competing payment instruments. They also discuss the impact of these factors on social welfare.

Academic Journal | June 01, 2003

Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature

Credit cards provide benefits to consumers and merchants not provided by other payment instruments as evidenced by their explosive growth in the number and value of transactions over the last 20 years. Recently, credit card networks have come under scrutiny from regulators and antitrust authorities around the world. The costs and benefits of credit cards to network participants are discussed. Focusing on interrelated bilateral transactions, several theoretical models have been constructed to study the implications of several business practices of credit card networks. The results and implications of these economic models along with future research topics are discussed.

Academic Journal | June 01, 2007

A Theory Of Credit Cards

Chakravorti and To construct a two-period model to study the interactions among consumers, merchants, and a card issuer. The model yields the following results. First, if the issuer's cost of funds is not too high and the merchant's profit margin is sufficiently high, in every equilibrium of our model the issuer extends credit to qualified consumers, merchants accept credit cards and consumers face a positive probability of default. Second, the issuer's ability to charge higher merchant discount fees depends on the number of customers gained when credit cards are accepted. Thus, credit cards exhibit characteristics of network goods. Third, each merchant faces a prisoner's dilemma where each independently chooses to accept credit cards, however, all merchants' two-period profits are reduced because of intertemporal business stealing across industries.

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